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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
purchaser bank, although it may have acted in good faith at the time of
purchase, could not be a holder in due course because it had been given
notice prior to purchase.
The Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the Illinois Appeals
case, said:8 "The State Supreme Court denied an application for certiorari
without more. The argument is that this amounted to approval of the con-
struction placed upon the statute by the Appeals Court. The point is not
well taken." Although the Supreme Court of the United States may not
have been bound by the Northwestern Natiowl Bank Case as was thus
explained, it is to be regretted that the latter case was not followed as
stating the better doctrine. J. C. L. '36
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-JOHNSON AcT.-The Federal District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma had taken jurisdiction of a suit by Cary,
a trustee of the Consolidated Gas Company, seeking an interlocutory injunc-
tion against the enforcement of reduced rates ordered by the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, and that court, sitting with three judges, had
granted the injunction prayed for.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States per curiam affirmed the decision. Held that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion; that, in view of the uncertainty pro-
duced by "diametrically opposed" decisions of the state courts2 as to the
availability of judicial review to one contesting an order of the Corpora-
tion Commission in the state courts, and in view of certain provisions of the
Oklahoma constitution,3 there was no "plain, speedy, and efficient" state
remedy as contemplated by the Johnson Act 4 and hence the District Court
was not deprived of its jurisdiction.5
The Johnson Act, passed by Congress on May 14, 1934, after prolonged
debate,6 was designed to eliminate unnecessary interference by the Federal
8 Graham v. White-Pillips Co., supra, 1. c. 30.
'Cary v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. (1935) 9 F. Supp.
709.
2 Swain v. Oklahoma Ry. Co. (1934) 168 Old. 133, 32 P. (2nd) 51;
Pioneer Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State (1914) 40 Okl. 417, 138 P.
(2nd) 1033.
8 Article 9, Sections 20, 22, 23, Oklahoma Constitution.
4 48 Stat. 775, 28 U. S. C. 41 (1). "An act to amend Section 24 of the
Judicial Code." (Senate Bill No. 752.) It provides: no District Court shall
have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of an order of an administra-
tive board or commission of a State, "where jurisdiction is based solely upon
the ground of diversity of citizenship, or the repugnance of such order to
the Constitution of the United States, where such order (1) affects rates
chargeable by a public utility, (2) does not interfere with interstate com-
merce, and (3) has been made after reasonable notice and hearing, and
where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity
in the courts of such state."
5 Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. v. Cary (Dec. 23, 1935)
56 S. Ct. 300.
6 (a) In the Senate, 78 Cong. Rec. (Part 2) 1915-1920, 2014-2024, 2238-
2243; (b) In the House, 78 Cong. Reec. (Part 8) 8322-8351, 8415-8433. (c)
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Courts with State regulation of utilities 7 and to assure to the States, best
acquainted with the economic needs of their inhabitants, control in the
first instance of the public utilities operating within their boundaries.8
Other purposes were to reduce the growing congestion in the Federal
Courts by withdrawing this class of cases from their jurisdiction;9 to
take away from the utilities the "unfair advantage" with which they were
blessed by reason of their freedom to choose as between Federal and state
judical systems when they desired to contest the order of a state regulatory
commission;' 0 and to do away with the greater expense characteristic of
proceedings in the Federal Courts.1
It was not contemplated by those who drew up the act that the utility
should be deprived of ultimate appeal to the Federal Courts through review
by the Supreme Court, but merely that the lower stages of the judicial
process should be pursued through the state judicial system rather than
the lower Federal Courts.1 2 It has been held by the Supreme Court that
due process requires that the issue of confiscation be left open to judicial
review upon both the law and the facts1 3 and the same court has declined
to review a legislative, as distinguished from a judicial, decision of a
court.14 Since legislative review by state courts is sometimes the only re-
view of public service commission orders which the state laws accord,18
doubt as to the interpretation which would be accorded to the requirement
of the Johnson Act that there must be in the courts of the state "a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy ...at law or in equity" arose before a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court was handed down.' 0 Must the remedy be judicial
or will a legislative review suffice?
The lower Federal Courts have refrained from ruling on this question
in other recent cases,17 since they have been able to find in the State sys-
In the Senate Judiciary Committee, Report No. 125, 73rd Congress, 1st
Session.
7 Supra, note 6 (a), 1916, 1917; 6 (c) pp. 3, 7, 8.
8 Supra, note 6 (a); 6 (c) p. 9.
9 Supra, note 6 (a); 6 (c) pp. 16-22; Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L. Q.,
499.
10 Supra, note 6; 6 (c) pp. 12-15, citing Black and White Taxi Co. v.
Brown and Yellow Taxi Co. (1928) 276 U. S. 518.
11 Supra, note 6 (c) p. 11.
12 Supra, note 6 (a) pp. 1915, 1916, 1918, 1919.
13 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287,
40 S. Ct. 527.
14Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. (1930) 281 U. S.
464, 50 S. Ct. 389.
15 Supra, note 3; see also Virginia Constitution of 1902, Section 156;
Virginia Code, Section 4066.16 Cullen, Legislative Restriction of Federal Jurisdiction over Local Rate
Regulation, 20 St. L. Law Review 308; 44 Yale Law Journal 119; 20 Iowa
Law Review 128.
17 In Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. City of Jackson (1935) 9 Fed.
Supp. 564, the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court was denied where
the State Chancery Court had independent jurisdiction to prevent by injunc-
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tems the means by which the utility could obtain at least theoretical judicial
review. But in the instant case the Supreme Court, in affirming the Dis-
trict Court's decision, plainly interprets the condition that the state remedy
be "pain, speedy, and efficient.., at law or in equity" as meaning that the
remedy must be judicial and not purely legislative. Under the Oklahoma
Constitution's and the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 9 that
court in reviewing the rate-setting orders of the Corporation Commission
acts in a legislative capacity. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the
Oklahoma lower courts can enjoin an order of the Corporation Commission
which is alleged to be confiscatory. 20 Such "uncertainty" and "the conse-
quent lack of the effective judicial remedy which was contemplated by the
Act of May 14, 1934," warrant the District Court in taking jurisdiction.
In so ruling the Supreme Court follows up the inference in Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line2l that after the plaintiff has pursued his legislative
remedy to finality he may then have the issue of confiscation tried in a
court of his own choosing.
What measure of judicial review will satisfy the "plain, speedy, and
efficient" clause the Supreme Court does not decide. But, whatever the
merits of exclusively legislative review may be,22 the Supreme Court has
not abandoned its requirement for more than just that. Those states which
provide no more23 must to some extent revise their judicial systems if they
would reserve to themselves, unimpeded by the lower Federal Courts, the
regulation of public utilities. Those states which provide more24 will need
tion the enforcement of municipal ordinances deemed void because con-
fiscatory of property.
In Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission of Montana, U. S.
Law Week, December 24, 1935, p. 333 (Federal District Court for Mon-
tana), jurisdiction was denied to the District Court under the presumption
that an existing state statute, if it prevented, as its words would imply, a
utility from obtaining temporary relief from an alleged confiscatory rate
order, would be held unconstitutional under Porter v. Investors Syndicate
(1932) 286 U. S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617.
Is Supra, note 3.
19 Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. v. State (1909) 23 Ok]. 510, 101
P. 262; Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. v. Miller (1911) 28 Old. 109,
114 P. 1104; Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Bartlesville(1913) 40 Ok). 28. 139 P. 694; City of Poteau v. American Indian Gas and
Oil Co. (1932) 159 Old. 240, 18 P. (2nd) 523.
20 Supra, note 2.
21 (1908) 211 U. S. 210.
22 Merrill, Does "Legislative Review" by the Court in Appeals from Pub-
lic Utility Commissions Constitute Due Process of Law?, 1 Indiana Law
Review 247.
22 Supra, notes 3, 15, 19.
24 Some states allow judicial review on appeal and injunctive relief in
varying degrees. Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929, Sections 5234-5237;
Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1929, Sections 11042-11043; Code of Alabama,
1923, Sections 9679, 9691, 9699-9701.
Some states provide appeals by statute, limiting the evidence to be re-
viewed by the courts. Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921, Sections 2960-2964;
Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, Crawford and Moses, 1921, Sections 1698-
1699.
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less, if any, change. In the instant case the Supreme Court has looked at
the judicial process of one of that class of states which provides through its
courts the minimum in the way of judicial review for the utility contesting
a regulatory commission's order. A recent decision of the 0klahoma Su-
preme Court, apparently conscious of the need for some change in policy,
restricts the field of suits which fall within the constitutionally-prescribed
legislative reviewing powers of the State Supreme Court.25
3. H. W., JR. '37.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-BES IPSA
LoQUITUR-EVIDENcE.-Plaintiff, employed by defendant as train auditor,
was injured in a wreck of defendant's train in which the engine and five
or six forward coaches left the track. Plaintiff had no control over the
management of the train, knew nothing of the condition of the track or
equipment, and was engaged only in the duty of collecting fares. In an
action by plaintiff under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it was held
that plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur rule.
Williams v. St. L. & S. F. Ry Co. (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 624.
This case is of interest in that, first, it holds the res ipsa loquitur rule
applicable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, an act which affects
the liability of carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce to their
employees in case of injury or death to the latter.1 There are earlier cases
which hold that the res ipsa loquitur rule cannot be invoked where the
master-servant relation exists.2 But it has been suggested that these cases
are based upon a misinterpretation of two previous cases.8 The defendant
in the case under discussion relied upon these two cases, among others, to
support its contention that the res ipsa loquitur rule was inapplicable in
cases arising between master and servant. The court, in disposing of this
contention, states that these cases are merely authority for the proposition
that the fact of an accident raises no presumption of negligence, a principle
which is well established.4 The only reasons offered for withholding the
rule in a suit by employee against employer are that the accident may be
attributed to the negligence of a fellow servant, or to the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff.5 These defenses have been abolished by the Act,
and therefore the reasons for not applying the rule lose their force. What-
25 Oklahoma Cotton Ginners Assn. v. State (1935) 51 P. (2nd) 327
(Old.).
145 USCA see. 51 et seq.
2 Chicago & N. W. By. Co. v. O'Brien, C. C. A. 8, 1904, 132 Fed. 593;
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dixon, C. C. A. 8, 1905, 139 Fed. 737; Shandrew
v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. By. Co., C. C. A. 8, 1905, 142 Fed. 320.3 5 Tulane Law Review 321. The cases misinterpreted were Patton v.
By. Co. (1901) 179 U. S. 658; Looney v. Metropolitan Ry. C. (1906) 200
U. S. 480.
4 Harper on Torts, p. 182.5 Ridge v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. (1914) 167 N. C. 510, 83 S. E. 762.
645 USCA secs. 51, 53, 54.
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